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The Cyberterrorism Threat:  
Findings from a Survey of Researchers 
 
Abstract 
This article reports on a recent research project exploring academic perspectives on the threat posed by 
cyberterrorism. The project employed a survey method, which returned 118 responses from researchers working 
across 24 different countries. The article begins with a brief review of existing literature on this topic, 
distinguishing between those concerned by the imminent threat of cyberterrorism, and other, more sceptical, 
views. Following a discussion on method, the article’s analysis section then details findings from three research 
questions: (i) Does cyberterrorism constitute a significant threat? If so, against whom or what?; (ii) Has a 
cyberterrorism attack ever taken place?’; and, (iii) What are the most effective countermeasures against 
cyberterrorism? Are there significant differences to more traditional forms of anti- or counter-terrorism? The 
article concludes by reflecting on areas of continuity and discontinuity between academic debate on 
cyberterrorism and on terrorism more broadly. 
 
Key words: Cyberterrorism, Terrorism, Terrorism Studies, Threat, Risk, Survey, Questionnaire. 
 
Introduction 
This article presents original findings from a recent research project focusing on 
understandings of cyberterrorism amongst the global research community. Its objective is to 
build upon and complement earlier studies that were integral to mapping the contours of 
academic research on terrorism. Foremost amongst these, of course, was Schmid and 
Jongman’s Political Terrorism,1 which included the use of a questionnaire, “…mailed to some 
two hundred members of the research community in the field of political terrorism in 1985”.2 
Silke’s edited Research on Terrorism offers a more recent, but related, review of the state of 
terrorism research, including of the major methodological techniques employed in this field,
3
 
and dominant research trends and interests.
4
 More recently still, Magnus Ranstorp and Silke 
published post-9/11 accounts of the primary concerns and limitations of contemporary 
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terrorism research.
5
 Studies such as these were important in consolidating what was known and 
understood about terrorism by the research community at particular moments in time. The 
research underpinning this article seeks to do something similar for one of the newest 
incarnations or constructions of this form of political violence: cyberterrorism. 
The article draws on responses to a survey completed by 118 researchers working in 24 
different countries across six continents. It focuses on their views on three sets of issues: first, 
whether cyberterrorism constitutes a significant threat and, if so, against what referent; second, 
whether a cyberterrorism attack has ever taken place; and, third, the most effective 
countermeasures against cyberterrorism and whether these differ significantly from more 
traditional forms of counterterrorism. The article proceeds in four sections. It begins with a 
review of the relevant academic literature. As a comparatively recent addition to the rubric of 
terrorism, scholarship on the specific threat posed by cyberterrorism remains relatively limited. 
Despite this, a spectrum of perspectives on this threat’s severity and imminence are 
identifiable, with the debate becoming increasingly polarised since the coining of this then-
neologism in the 1980s. The second section details the methodology of the research, reflecting 
in particular on the sampling strategy employed and distribution of respondents. The third 
section describes and analyses the research findings. It outlines the diversity of responses 
received, arguing that these are the product of conceptual, definitional and inferential 
disagreements. Finally, the article concludes by pointing to the importance of these findings for 
examining the relations between cyber- and other forms of terrorism. 
  
The Cyberterrorism Threat: Academic Debate 
The extent to which cyberterrorism poses a genuine security threat to any form of referent 
object (a state, a corporation, citizens, and so on) is amongst the most contested of topics 
within this research area. In part, this is a product of terminological dispute. More expansive 
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conceptions of cyberterrorism as any form of online terrorist activity unsurprisingly tend to be 
associated with a higher estimated probability of the threat’s materialisation than do more 
restrictive accounts.
6 
 At the same time, as detailed further below, competing threat 
assessments remain even if we restrict our focus to narrower understandings of this concept 
(described, by some, as ‘pure cyberterrorism’7), such as the following: 
  
unlawful attacks and threats of attack against computers, networks, and the information stored therein 
when done to intimidate or coerce a government or its people in furtherance of political or social 
objectives. Further, to qualify as cyberterrorism, an attack should result in violence against persons or 
property, or at least cause enough harm to generate fear. Attacks that lead to death or bodily injury, 
explosions, plane crashes, water contamination, or severe economic loss would be examples. Serious 
attacks against critical infrastructures could be acts of cyberterrorism, depending on their impact. Attacks 
that disrupt nonessential services or that are mainly a costly nuisance would not.
8
 
 
This section sets out two contrasting perspectives within debate on the threat of cyberterrorism 
when approached in this relatively narrow way: First, a ‘concerned’ view that sees 
cyberterrorism as constitutive of a genuine security threat; and, second, a ‘sceptical’ view of 
cyberterrorism as little more than hyperbolic media construction. It goes on to explain that 
sceptical accounts which advance the latter perspective frequently contrast cyberterrorism per 
se with other terroristic usages of information technology, which are often seen as posing a 
significant threat and requiring, as such, greater attention. 
 Assessments of cyberterrorism as a significant, and pressing, security challenge were 
particularly prominent in early debate on this phenomenon, and remain so within media and 
political discourse today.
9
 Amongst its better known advocates has been Barry Collin of the US 
Institute for Security and Intelligence - the individual responsible for coining the term in the 
1980s. As Collin argued in 1997, “make no mistake, the threats are real today”.10 This, for 
Collin, is because cyber-attacks now pose similar destructive capacity to traditional physical 
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assaults, including the prospect of multiple casualties and considerable publicity. Potential 
threats he identifies include the contamination of food products through interference with 
manufacturing processes, and the interception of air traffic control systems to engender fatal 
collisions.
11
  
 Collin is not alone in hypothesising such scenarios. Dorothy Denning - perhaps the 
highest profile scholar in this field - suggests that while “cyberterrorism has been mainly 
theoretical to date; it is something to watch and take reasonable precautions against”.12 Cronin 
notes that globalisation has offered terrorist organisations access to the technologies required 
for cyberterrorism as well as the wider audiences and recruitment potentialities often attributed 
to this socio-political process.
13
 Gabrielle Weimann identifies five factors that render cyber-
attacks appealing to terrorists. These include comparatively lower financial costs; the prospect 
of anonymity; a wider selection of available targets; the ability to conduct attacks remotely; 
and, the potential for multiple casualties.
14
 Furnell and Warren argue similarly that, “from the 
perspective of someone wishing to cause damage, there is now the capability to undermine and 
disable a society without a single shot being fired or missile being launched”.15 This, they add, 
“enables simultaneous attacks at multiple nodes worldwide without requiring a large terrorist 
infrastructure necessary to mount equivalent attacks using traditional methods”16. Related 
utility-maximisation arguments suggest it is inevitable terrorists will employ cyber-weaponry if 
benefits from so doing are likely,
17
 and/or if an enemy employs computers and networks as 
security tools, or maintains dominance in this area.
18
 Such thinking is integral to the ‘electronic 
pearl harbour’19 scenarios which dominate much of the non-academic attention cyberterrorism 
receives. 
 Within these discussions of the threat posed by cyberterrorism, two issues in particular 
are frequently invoked: the vulnerability of Critical Information Infrastructures (CIIs), and 
contemporary dependences on information technologies.
20
 Although inconsistently understood, 
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CIIs refer to those services that would have a debilitating impact on national security and 
economic and social welfare if destroyed.
21
 The vulnerability of CII’s is linked, inter alia, to 
their connection to the Internet, the infrequency and high cost of software updates, and the 
sporadic implementation of attack detection and prevention systems which can slow services 
down.
22
 One of the main challenges involved in CII protection is the problem of attribution, 
and the challenge of locating responsibility for attacks. It is difficult, for example, to be certain 
whether a system’s failure is accidental or due to a malicious attack.23 Unlike a physical attack 
in which action and effect are often near-simultaneous, the consequences of a cyber-attack may 
not be noticeable for a considerable amount of time. That it is also possible to disguise one’s 
identity on the Internet, using such means as ‘botnets’,24 further complicates the ability to 
identify from where an intrusion has derived. These challenges become more acute still when 
we recognise the constant increase in the complexity of information systems,
 
and the gap that 
has opened with capabilities for mitigating emergent problems.
25
 
 Although concerns such as the above dominated early debate in this area, more recent 
scholarship has witnessed the arrival of dissenting voices. Amongst these, the cyberterrorism 
threat is viewed as little more than a speculative (typically, media) fantasy; an outgrowth, for 
some, of the need to replace newly-redundant Cold War security imaginaries in the 1980s and 
1990s. As an aggregate of terrorism, technology and the unknown, constructions of 
cyberterrorism - and related risks - are viewed here as parasitic upon - and multipliers of - fears 
over contemporary dependences on information systems.
26
 Thus, authors such as Hansen and 
Nissenbaum deploy securitization theory in an effort to analyse and unravel cyber-security 
discourses.
27
 Doing so is crucial, they argue, as a means of contesting security claims in this 
area which appear either self-evident or unchallengeable due to their framing in technical, 
specialised language. As they put it, “cyber securitizations are particularly powerful precisely 
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because they involve a double move out of the political realm: from the politicized to the 
securitized, and from the political to the technified”28.  
 One of the most sustained deconstructions of the cyberterrorist threat is provided by 
Maura Conway.
29
 Terrorists, she notes, are routinely dehumanised, while technology is 
associated with a lack of control over the world. The combination of these spectres is, 
therefore, ripe for the establishment of worst case scenarios in which entire societies are ‘cut 
off’ and thus rendered vulnerable by the ‘evil’ of terrorists.30 Conway suggests that this 
construction of worst-case scenarios is a product of media as much as political discourse: 
 
The media plays a key role in the shaping of these assumptions, constructing these scenarios, and 
generally informing us as to what is “out there”. It is thus a prime mover in the process of defining 
security […] with the aid of the mass media, cyberterrorism came to be viewed as the ‘new’ security 
threat par excellence.
31
 
 
Critics of the constructions of threat that surround cyberterrorism forward two further 
arguments. First, these discourses are not necessarily driven by - and do not necessarily 
correspond with - empirical realities. Bendrath, for example, has mapped dramatic changes in 
US perceptions of the cyber world and the oscillation between cyberterrorism and 
cyberwarfare as the bogeymen du jour irrespective of concrete, ‘real world’, developments.32 
Conway points similarly to the impact of intangibly related events - such as 9/11 - to public 
policy on cybersecurity, where, for example, “the Council of Europe rushed through its 
Convention on Cybercrime in response to the attack”.33 Second, these authors also highlight 
the internalisation of these discourses by publics or users of ICT. For instance, “75% of global 
internet users believe ‘cyberterrorists’ may, soon inflict massive casualties on innocent lives by 
attacking corporate and governmental computer networks” while 45% of users agreed 
completely that “computer terrorism will be a growing problem”.34 Whether accurate or 
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otherwise, in other words, these discourses have real world impacts across different social 
strata.  
 One of the reasons offered for the argument that ‘pure’ cyberterrorism constitutes a 
relatively less significant risk is that cyber-attacks are comparatively unattractive to terrorists. 
In addition to the fact that they lack theatricality,
35
 Giacomello, for example, offers a 
cost/benefit analysis of cyberterrorism to argue that traditional methods of terrorism and 
weapons remain more effective at killing people, and thereby growing the desired political 
capital.
36
 These accounts frequently contrast the possibility of cyber-attack with other terrorist 
uses of information technology which are regarded as a pressing and largely overlooked threat. 
Attention, then, should be given to the wider use of the Internet by terrorists, including for 
“recruitment, financing, networking information gathering [and] sharing information”37 all of 
which enhance the efficiency and reach of terrorist groups.
38
 On this view, the nightmare 
scenarios associated with cyberterrorism should be replaced by a focus on this broad range of 
activities, with a range of political, policing and civil society stakeholders having a role in 
countering them.
39
 
 Within this debate on the level of threat posed by cyberterrorism, issues of spatiality 
and jurisdictional responsibility are also prominent, not least over whether the issue is better 
understood in national or international terms. Yould, for example, argues that the borderless 
nature of cyber-security challenges, and the globally connected nature of networks and 
infrastructure, “undermine – or, at the very least, render contingent – the sovereignty and 
significance of the nation-state”40. Similarly, Cavelty argues that “the vulnerabilities of modern 
societies – caused by their dependence on a spectrum of highly interdependent information 
systems – have global origins and implications”41. Other studies go further still, questioning 
whether security frameworks and organisations are at all appropriate to tackle threats in 
cyberspace
42
. Hardy identifies a number of problems in responding to cyberterrorism from a 
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national security perspective arguing that differences in the understanding and legal definition 
of terrorism have caused vast inconsistencies of prosecution across Western democracies. For 
Hardy, this is rooted in the fact that each country has applied its own understanding to this 
threat
43
 and that state-led approaches “fail to recognise the nature of the globally 
interdependent network environment and the leading role of the private sector in this 
domain”44.  
 
Research Methodology 
The above overview demonstrates two things, in particular, about the current state of 
scholarship on the threat posed by cyberterrorism. First, and most obviously, there is 
considerable diversity of perspective amongst contributors to debate in this area. As with 
debate on the extent to which terrorism more widely poses a current threat, it is difficult to 
identify any consensus here.
45
 Second, and in spite of these disagreements, it is possible to 
point to changes of emphasis and perspective in the time that has passed since the term 
‘cyberterrorism’ was first coined. This should, perhaps, be expected given the dramatic 
geopolitical and technological developments that have taken place across the globe since the 
early 1980s. 
 As noted earlier, one of the aims of the research underpinning this article was to capture 
as fully as possible the current state of academic opinion - and debate - on the threat posed by 
cyberterrorism by use of a survey methodology. Employing a combination of closed and open-
ended questions, the survey was distributed to over six hundred academics and researchers 
working on terrorism or cyberterrorism. The survey was distributed between June and 
November 2012, and employed a purposive sampling strategy to identify potential respondents. 
This strategy made use of four primary methods. 
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 First, a targeted literature review was undertaken to identify researchers with a record 
of publishing on cyberterrorism within peer-reviewed journals, monographs, edited books, or 
other relevant literature. This task was completed using the main catalogue of the British 
Library and a total of 47 other online databases (including JSTOR, Oxford Journals online, 
SAGE journals online, Wiley Interscience, Springer Link, IEEE Xplore, Lecture Notes in 
Computer Science and Zetoc).
46
 The search was limited to publications on or since January 1
st
 
2004. To this was added a second set of potential respondents identified by their standing in the 
wider terrorism research community. Whilst these individuals may not directly have published 
on cyberterrorism, their expertise and knowledge of definitional, causal, and related debates on 
terrorism rendered their opinions relevant to this research. To this end, individuals that had 
authored an article in any of the following four major journals on terrorism since January 1
st
 
2009 were added to the sample: Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Terrorism and Political 
Violence, Critical Studies on Terrorism, and, Perspectives on Terrorism. Members of the 
editorial boards of these journals (as of August 1
st
 2012) were also added. The first two 
journals are widely recognised as the most prominent specialist outlets for publishing peer-
reviewed research on terrorist violence.
47
 As Silke argued in 2004, “Taken together - and 
bearing in mind their different publishers, separate editorial teams and largely separate editorial 
boards (though there is some overlap on this last) - the two journals can be regarded as 
providing a reasonably balanced impression of research activity in the field”.48 The latter two 
journals were included to take account of the extent to which terrorism research has expanded 
dramatically across the last ten years,
49
 and become more hotly contested in the process.
50
 
 The third sampling technique was a ‘snowball method’ that included respondents 
identified to us by individuals who had already completed and returned the survey. And, 
finally, we employed targeted requests for respondents disseminated via the mailing lists of 
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two UK-based academic organisations: the Terrorism and Political Violence Association,
51
 and 
the British International Studies Association Critical Terrorism Studies Working Group.
52
 
 This use of a purposive, non-probabilistic, sampling strategy was appropriate to the 
survey’s aims.53 Although the method cannot claim any statistical representativeness in relation 
to the terrorism research community, such a claim would be difficult to sustain whatever the 
sample given the contestable, fluid and porous nature of this population.
54
 Researchers enter 
and leave this community according to the evolving nature of their research interests, and any 
effort to capture opinion therein can offer only a static snapshot of a dynamic phenomenon. In 
this sense, the sacrifice of representativeness in our study is justified given that no discernible, 
definitive, population can meaningfully be said to exist. 
  A second potential limitation derives from the nature of the academic process and its 
extended temporalities. By sampling, in part, according to authorship in this area (however 
contemporary the published work), this research may provide an already-dated snapshot of this 
community. Published work only reports on projects, and perhaps even research interests, that 
are now completed. Much of the newest research - in PhD theses, for instance - will not have 
entered print yet. By using multiple sampling methods - and especially the mailing lists of 
current research communities – this research attempted to mitigate these concerns. The 
possibility remains, however, that junior researchers, newcomers to the field and other groups 
may be underrepresented in our study. 
 With these caveats in mind, our survey generated a total of 118 responses from 24 
countries spanning six continents. 41 (35%) of the 117 respondents who provided geographical 
information worked in the United States of America, and 31 (27%) in the United Kingdom. 
Australia accounted for 7 of our respondents (6%), and Canada 4 (3%). This weighting toward 
Anglophonic countries is unfortunate, but to be expected given that this replicates the 
geographical trends of terrorism research.
55
 In terms of employment status, our sample was 
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divided as follows: Academic Staff (Permanent): 75 (64%); Academic Staff (Temporary): 16 
(14%); Research Student: 9 (8%); Independent Researcher: 11 (9%); Retired: 2 (2%); and, 
None of the Above: 5 (4%). In relation to disciplinary background, finally, our sample broke 
down thus: Political Science/International Relations: 69 (50%); Psychology/Anthropology: 20 
(15%); Engineering/Computer Science/Cyber 17 (12%); Law/Criminology: 15 (11%); 
Literature/Arts/History: 9 (7%); Independent Researchers/Analysts: 5 (4%); and, 
Economics/Business: 2 (1%).
56
 That half of our sample were Political Scientists or 
International Relations scholars again resonates with earlier empirical studies of contributors to 
terrorism research.
57
 
 The survey’s substantive questions focused on four broad categories of question. First, 
definitional issues in relation to cyberterrorism and terrorism more widely. Second, the threat 
posed by cyberterrorism. Third, issues of response and deterrence. And, fourth, respondent 
views of current research in this area, including the challenges facing scholars. This focus 
reflected the survey’s overall ambition to investigate prominent contemporary concerns of the 
relevant academic community, and to chart parallels with related, earlier, studies of (non-) 
cyberterrorism research. In the following, this article turns to the findings of the survey and 
their importance in relation to the cyberterrorism threat. 
 
Findings and Analysis
58
 
Three questions in the survey were specifically designed to assess researcher perceptions on 
the threat posed by cyberterrorism. These provide the focus for the following discussion, and 
were articulated thus:  
 
Question 10: In your view, does cyberterrorism constitute a significant threat? If so, against 
 whom or what is the threat focused? 
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Question 11: With reference to your previous responses, do you consider that a 
 cyberterrorism attack has ever taken place? 
Question 12: In your view what are the most effective countermeasures against 
 cyberterrorism? Are there significant differences to more traditional forms of anti- or 
 counter-terrorism? 
 
Each question provided a ‘free text’ boxes for respondents (alongside, in the case of question 
11, a dropdown menu), in order to capture the widest and fullest range of responses. As 
demonstrated below, these responses have been used to generate qualitative and quantitative 
findings. 
 Question 10 - on the threat posed by cyberterrorism - was answered by 110 respondents 
to our survey (response rate: 93%). These responses were coded by a quinquepartite scale, the 
findings from which are contained in Chart 1:  
 
[Insert chart 1 here] 
 
In line with the academic literature detailed above, this question generated a diversity of 
responses. The majority of respondents - 58% - answered in the affirmative, although these 
identified a diverse range of referents (see Table 1).  Most common were states or 
governments, especially, “certain high profile countries”.59 One respondent, for instance, 
identified “powerful states”60; another mentioned the US, Russia and China as targets.61 The 
second most common answer was critical infrastructures: financial institutions;
62
 transportation 
networks;
63
 intelligence networks;
64
 energy grids;
65
 water systems;
66
 agriculture;
67
 and, 
emergency services.
68
 Ten respondents stated that the threat is focussed on civilians and 
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individuals, and the same number stated that the threat is focussed on organizations, the private 
sector, corporations and/or the economy. 
 
[Insert table 1 here] 
 
That respondents were divided on both aspects of this question - the extent of threat posed, and 
the referent object - was a product of four factors. The first was the importance of particular 
understandings of ‘threat’. This was especially so amongst those identifying critical 
infrastructures and computer networks as the focus of potential attacks. Thus, some 
respondents referred to entire economies, transport networks or energy systems being “at 
risk”69, of society’s capacity to function being crippled70 and organisations being paralyzed,71 
and of daily life being seriously disrupted.
72
 Others, in contrast, described this risk in terms of 
“disruption”,73 interruption,74 and ‘significant ramifications’.75 A second factor was the logic 
by which such threats were articulated. Some respondents referred to the possible emulation of 
recent events - such as the Stuxnet attack in Iran - by terrorists.
76
 Others, in contrast, framed 
this threat in the abstract, discussing, for example, the possibility of violence against people or 
property.
77
 Third, part of this diversity was a product of competing conceptions of 
cyberterrorism. Replicating the trend noted in the literature review section, those willing to 
countenance a wider conception of cyberterrorism identified a range of possible threat 
scenarios extending beyond attacks on people, property or critical infrastructures and essential 
services. Four respondents referred to cyberterrorists threatening national security by obtaining 
sensitive intelligence and classified information.
78
 Others referred to terrorists committing 
cybercrime, including obtaining individuals’ bank details and accessing financial and other 
information from both public and private sector institutions.
79
 One respondent understood 
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cyberterrorism to include online harassment
80
 and another warned of cyberattacks being 
perpetrated to influence elections.
81
 
 Fourth, respondents’ answers to this question also raised temporal issues. Thus, some 
negative responses were qualified with phrasing such as, “at the moment”82 or “at present”.83 
Others, meanwhile, were more equivocal, warning that cyberterrorism has the potential to 
become a significant threat, if it is not one at present. One respondent, for example, stated: 
“Cyberterrorism is a potential threat and a potentially significant one … [A]t the moment, 
cyberterrorism is not a threat but a risk”.84 Others still, stated that cyberterrorism is currently a 
significant threat because of what terrorists might do in the future: 
 
Yes. What has been done against the Iranian government recently could potentially be done against any 
government by any actors, and that is probably just the beginning.
85
 
 
Yes, but one that is not yet manifest because terrorists lack the skills to mount an effective attack.
86
 
 
It does. However, it is the future of the threat that truly counts and, I think, is really worrisome.
87
 
 
The respondents that stated cyberterrorism does not constitute a significant threat offered three 
reasons to support their position. First, three respondents pointed to the fact that cyberterrorism 
(as they conceptualised this phenomenon) has never occurred.
88
 One stated that we have “no 
precedent and few metrics” to assess the cyberterrorist threat.89 Another said that “empirical 
evidence is almost non-existent”, adding that hypothesised scenarios are often, “blue sky 
thinking”.90 Second, six respondents stated that terrorist organisations lack the capability to 
attack critical infrastructures and essential services.
91
 Of these, two doubted whether terrorists 
will ever acquire this level of expertise,
92
 while three others suggested that things might change 
in the future.
93
 As one commented, “Non-state actors don’t seem to have the know-how 
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(yet)”.94 Third, two respondents opined that terrorists lack any motivation to perpetrate 
cyberterrorist attacks.
95
 As one explained: 
 
[C]yberterrorism lacks the heroic quality of e.g. a suicide bombing and thus has less appeal to potential 
terrorists. I think the self-image can be a very important factor in a radicalisation process, and in this sense 
cyberterrorist attacks do not fulfil this need to the extent that other forms of terrorism do.
96
 
 
The other went on to suggest that what is significant is not the cyberterrorist threat itself, but 
the manner in which this threat has been articulated: “At present, it is not a significant threat. 
The hyperbolic inflation of its threat in public discourse and the potential ramifications for civil 
liberties is far more significant, in my view”.97 Other respondents expressed similar sentiments. 
One stated that cyberterrorism is a significant threat “because ‘we’ (officials, emergency and 
military personnel, media again, in the US) act and talk as though it is”.98 Another commented 
that cyberterrorism “is a threat if it is constituted as such by security discourse”.99 Views such 
as these clearly reflect the broadly constructivist position held by many of the sceptical 
scholars explored in the above literature review section. 
 Responses to question 11 - on whether a cyberterrorist attack had ever taken place - 
raised similar issues. Respondents were invited to select either “Yes” or “No” from a 
dropdown menu, with an additional free text box allowing further explanation. 113 respondents 
answered this question (response rate: 96%). Three of these selected neither “Yes” nor “No”, 
explaining that they were unsure. As Chart 2 shows, of the remaining 110 respondents, 
remarkably 55 selected “Yes” and 55 selected “No”. 
 
[Insert chart 2 here] 
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When findings for this question are restricted to those respondents who had earlier stated that 
cyberterrorism does constitute a significant threat, only 42 of this sample of 63 (67%) believed 
an attack had yet taken place. This indicates the importance of deductive reasoning as well as 
inductive inferences in conceptions of current and future risks. As might be expected given the 
comparative novelty of cybersecurity threats, the past is not necessarily seen as a reliable guide 
to understanding the present or future. 
 Respondents who stated that cyberterrorist attacks had taken place offered a number of 
examples, listed in Table 2 below. The table uses the wording provided by respondents, with 
the authors’ interpretation of the events contained in the footnotes. 
 
[Insert table 2 here] 
 
Some other respondents gave more general - and quite diverse - examples. These included: 
theft of monies to fund terrorist organisations;
100
 the preparation of terrorist attacks;
101
 calls for 
home-grown terrorism;
102
 attacks against individuals that governments perceive as 
dissidents
103
; and, cyber espionage.
104
 
 The respondents that stated a cyberterrorist attack had not yet taken place did not 
explicitly dispute that any of the events in Table 2 had occurred. Rather, they typically 
provided reasons for doubting attacks such as these could constitute cyberterrorism. First, eight 
respondents invoked an actor-specific definition of cyberterrorsm, arguing that some of the 
highest profile cyberattacks to have taken place, such as Stuxnet and upon Estonia, were not 
terrorist because they were not perpetrated by non-state groups.
105
 Some of these respondents 
explicated further, suggesting that attacks carried out by state actors are better understood as 
cyber warfare. Second, seven respondents said that high profile cyberattacks could not qualify 
as (cyber)terrorist because they had not resulted in violence against people or property.
106
 As 
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one respondent explained: “no person has ever been killed or injured as the result of an attack 
executed by using weaponised computer code”.107 Third, four respondents argued that there is 
a distinction between cyberterrorism and cybercrime.
108
 One of these argued that, whilst 
terrorists might commit cybercrime in order to facilitate terrorist activity, this does not render 
the criminal activity terrorist. On this view, there is a difference between: (a) cyberterrorism; 
and, (b) cybercrime committed for terrorist purposes (such as to raise funds)
109
. Another 
respondent argued that hacktivism must be distinguished from cyberterrorism
110
, though two 
other respondents suggested that the activities of Anonymous render this distinction more 
problematic.
111
 Fourth, four respondents stated that the cyberattacks that have occurred did not 
instil fear in a wider audience and/or were not carried out with an intention to generate such 
fear.
112
 Absent this element of intimidation or coercion, these respondents said that 
cyberattacks do not constitute cyberterrorism. Lastly, three respondents said that those who 
have perpetrated attacks to date lacked the political or ideological motive necessary for the 
attack to qualify as (cyber)terrorist.
113
 
 As stated previously, the fact that a respondent believed that no cyberterrorist attack has 
ever occurred did not necessarily mean that cyberterrorism was not viewed as a significant 
threat. Chart 3 shows the responses to question 10 of those respondents that answered no to 
question 11. Interestingly, in spite of the perceived absence of any cyberterrorist attacks to 
date, a greater proportion of these respondents stated that cyberterrorism poses a significant 
threat than stated it does not (35% compared to 29%). Moreover, an additional 15% of these 
respondents stated that cyberterrorism may potentially or possibly become a significant threat. 
 
[Insert chart 3 here] 
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 The final question to be explored focused more explicitly on issues of vulnerability and 
response than of capability and intention. Here, respondents were asked to name the most 
effective countermeasures against cyberterrorism, and then to detail whether there are 
significant differences to more traditional forms of anti- or counter-terrorism. 93 responses 
were received (response rate: 79%), although some respondents only answered part of the 
question. 
 In response to the first part of the question, twelve countermeasures were identified by 
at least two respondents (see Chart 4). One - target-hardening - dominated our responses, with 
35 respondents mentioning this mechanism. Some of these framed their comments quite 
generally, for example: “Enhanced IT security”114 or “Technical security measures”.115 Others, 
in contrast, gave more specific suggestions including “Redundancies in various civilian and 
critical online systems”116, “Firewalls”,117 “Closed secure networks”,118 “Keeping sensitive 
data in encrypted format”119 and “Increases in biometric security systems”.120 
 
[Insert chart 4 here] 
 
A number of other countermeasures were mentioned by only one respondent. These included: 
refraining from starting illegal wars;
121
 switching our focus from non-state to state actors;
122
 
and, education and humanitarian aid.
123
 
 The four most common responses to the second part of this question - on the 
peculiarities of countering cyberterrorism - are detailed in Chart 5. 17 respondents (18%) 
argued that, whilst the methods employed might be different, countering cyberterrorism 
involves the same underlying strategies as other forms of terrorism. By contrast, 16 
respondents (17%) believed there to be a significant difference with other forms of terrorism in 
that greater technical expertise is required to counter cyberterrorism. These two viewpoints are 
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not necessarily incompatible. Whilst one focuses on the underlying principles (prevention, 
protection, resilience, etc), the other focuses on what the application of these principles looks 
like in practice. This was summed up neatly by one respondent, who said “Yes, from 
technological point of view, not from ideological point of view”.124 
 
[Insert chart 5 here] 
 
The 12 countermeasures listed in chart 4 were identified by a total of 60 respondents.
125
 Of 
these, it is worth noting that 14 had said (in response to question 10) that cyberterrorism does 
not constitute a significant threat.
126
 So, the majority of the respondents that did not regard 
cyberterrorism as a significant threat nonetheless identified countermeasures. There were two 
reasons for this. First, five of these respondents explained that, whilst cyberterrorism does not 
constitute a significant threat, cyberwarfare and cybercrime do.
127
 Measures taken in response 
to these other threats will also improve security against cyberterrorism. In the words of one 
respondent, “defensive measures taken against cybercrime and cyberwarfare will also work 
against cyberterrorism”.128 Second, five of these respondents explained that, whilst 
cyberterrorism does not constitute a significant threat, other forms of terrorism do.
129
 For these 
researchers, measures taken to combat other forms of terrorism will also improve security 
against cyberterrorism. In fact, one respondent went further and argued that seeking 
specifically to tackle cyberterrorism could prove ultimately counterproductive: 
 
If we develop specific ‘counter-terrorism’ strategies for ‘cyberterrorism’, then we risk overlooking the 
motivations that underlie this impulse towards violence. Whether an act of terrorism is digitally or physically 
realised is but a particular manifestation of these motivations. It is important, therefore, that this basic 
rudiment of understanding ‘terrorism’ does not get lost in the ‘cyberterrorism’ hyperbole.130 
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Tables 3 and 4 complete this section of the article by detailing responses to questions 11 and 12 
by the disciplinary backgrounds of respondents. 
 
[Insert table 3 here] 
 
Table 3 compares the disciplinary backgrounds of those respondents that opined that a 
cyberterrorist attack has, and hasn’t, taken place with the backgrounds of the general pool of 
respondents. It is worth noting, first, that there were respondents from all seven groups that 
believed a cyberterrorist attack has taken place. In contrast, whilst there were respondents from 
five of the disciplinary groups that stated that a cyberterrorist attack has never taken place, 
there were no respondents from the other two groups (B and C) that held this view. This was 
particularly striking for disciplinary group B (Law, Criminology, et al), given that this group 
accounted for 11% of the general pool of respondents. Also striking was the fact that 
respondents from Group A (Political Science, International Relations, et al) accounted for 34% 
of those that stated that a cyberterrorist attack has taken place but 69% of those that said that 
such an attack has never occurred. 
 
[Insert table 4 here] 
 
Table 4 shows the disciplinary backgrounds of the respondents that proposed each of the 
identified countermeasures. Although the number of respondents is small for many of them, 
two interesting findings nonetheless emerge. First, some countermeasures seemed to be more 
closely linked to respondents from a particular disciplinary background. For example, while 
42% of respondents who identified one of these 12 countermeasures were from Political 
Science and International Relations backgrounds (Group A), this group accounted for 67% of 
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those warning against exaggerating the threat, and 80% of those promoting counter-
radicalization. In similar vein, 57% of the respondents that argued for enhanced international 
co-operation were from group D (Engineering, Computer Science, Cyber, et al) even though 
this group only accounted for 17% of all respondents, and 67% of those that suggested 
employing hackers were from group E (Psychology, Anthropology, et al) even though this 
group only accounted for 16% of all respondents. Second, the twelve countermeasures listed in 
the table were mentioned by respondents from across all seven disciplinary groups: none were 
restricted to any one background. As detailed further below, these two findings point to the 
importance of a multidisciplinary approach to responding to cyberterrorism. 
 
Conclusion 
As the preceding discussion has shown, there is considerable disagreement within the academic 
research community around cyberterrorism. According to the findings of this project’s survey, 
no meaningful consensus exists around the extent to which this phenomenon poses a security 
threat; the potential targets of cyberterrorist attacks; indeed, whether cyberterrorism has even 
yet occurred. The roots of this disagreement are, in part, conceptual. As detailed above, 
different interpretations of ‘threat’ and ‘significance’ as well as different assessments of 
imminence were evident throughout the qualitative findings generated in this research. It was 
also, however, partly a product of competing logics for assessing and predicting threat: not 
least, divergent views on the past’s reliability for inferential reasoning on the future. 
Definitional issues were important here too. Although fifteen different attacks were identified 
by our respondents as cyberterrorism - attacks stretching, incidentally, across Australia, 
Estonia, India, Iran, Israel, the US and beyond - others disqualified these for a number of 
reasons. Thus, the lack of physical violence or death from attacks launched in cyberspace to 
date was, for some, reason not to describe these as cyberterrorism. For others, the lack of fear 
The Cyberterrorism Threat: A Survey 
 
22 
 
generated by cyberattacks (especially, vis-à-vis their physical equivalents) was of relevance. 
For others still, an actor-specific conception of cyberterrorism was needed to differentiate this 
phenomenon from state-based cyber-war attacks. Some respondents, moreover, emphasised the 
importance of differentiating cyberterrorism from cybercrime or cyberactivism. 
 The extent of this disagreement has two obvious parallels. The first, detailed at the start 
of this article, is that within the academic literature on the threat of cyberterrorism specifically. 
As argued there, this literature has gradually witnessed the emergence of competing 
perspectives to counter-balance the earliest - and in some senses most hyperbolic - of 
predictions around the likelihood and scale of future attacks. Many of the respondents raised 
issues explored in this literature - CII vulnerabilities, the preferences of terrorist actors, issues 
of global interconnectivity, and so forth - with a small number of others speaking instead to the 
construction of ‘cyberterrorism’ as a present/future threat. The second obvious parallel is 
existing academic debate on terrorism more widely, which has long been characterised by 
competing views of how best to calculate risk in this area.
131
 In some senses, at least, current 
academic perspectives on cyberterrorism may therefore simply represent an extension of the 
positions held in relation to its parent concept. 
In addition to these contiguities, however, it is also important to note two findings from 
the survey that point to the potential distinctiveness of cyberterrorism. First, a number of the 
respondents identified the need for specific types of expertise for the countering of 
cyberterrorism vis-à-vis other terrorisms. While some of these were environment-specific (for 
example, air walling), others invoked the need for new types of partnership between sectors 
and actors across the socio-political spectrum. Whilst the countering of terrorism has always 
evolved over time, and new types of actors have been brought into this public policy area,
132
 
these findings do speak to a debate over the distinctiveness of preventive and responsive 
activities in this particular context. 
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The second respect in which the research findings suggest cyberterrorism is distinct is 
the level of contestability surrounding the term. Its parent concept terrorism is, of course, the 
subject of longstanding – and well-worn – definitional controversies. Whether particular 
attacks or uses of violence warrant this terminology is hotly debated: not least in relation to 
‘state terrorism’. There is also debate over the objective or subjective status of the labelling of 
an act as ‘terrorist’ and over the likelihood of future attacks.133 Yet, in spite of this, one would 
be hard-pressed to find a researcher willing to argue it has never occurred. In stark contrast, 
half of respondents to this survey believed cyberterrorism has already occurred, while the other 
half believed it has not. This demonstrates a level of contestability - conceptual and otherwise - 
that stretches far beyond debate on offline or non-cyberterrorism. 
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Chart 1: Cyberterrorism: A Significant Threat? 
 
 
 
Table 1: Referent Objects of the Cyberterrorism Threat 
 
Government/state 23 respondents 
Critical infrastructure/computer networks 19 respondents 
Civilians/individuals 10 respondents 
Organizations/private 
sector/corporations/economy 
10 respondents 
Society 3 respondents 
Anyone/everyone 3 respondents 
Groups 2 respondents 
Political elections 1 respondent 
 
[Some respondents identified more than one referent] 
 
 
 
Chart 2: Has a cyberterrorist attack ever taken place? (All respondents) 
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Table 2: Examples of cyberterrorist attacks offered by respondents 
 
Attacks on Estonia
134
 11 respondents 
Stuxnet, Iran
135
 6 respondents 
Attacks on Georgia
136
 3 respondents 
India-Pakistan
137
 2 respondents 
Anonymous
138
 2 respondents 
Turkey PKK collapsed Govt network
139
 1 respondent 
Zapatista spamming
140
 1 respondent 
Wikileaks 1 respondent 
Israel-Gaza
141
 1 respondent 
India (social networking)
142
 1 respondent 
Dalai Lama
143
 1 respondent 
Tariq bin Ziyad Brigades
144
 1 respondent 
Aerospace
145
 1 respondent 
Australian sewage leak
146
 1 respondent 
Kyrgyzstan
147
 1 respondent 
 
 
Chart 3: Does cyberterrorism constitute a significant threat? (Those respondents that 
stated that no cyberterrorist attack has ever taken place) 
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Chart 4: The most effective countermeasures against cyberterrorism 
 
 
 
Chart 5: Differences to other forms of anti- or counter-terrorism 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Has a cyberterrorist attack ever taken place? (By disciplinary background) 
 
 
All respondents 
Those 
respondents that 
said a 
cyberterrorist 
attack has taken 
Those 
respondents that 
said a 
cyberterrorist 
attack has not 
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place taken place 
Group A (Political Science, 
International Relations, et al) 
50% 34% 69% 
Group B (Law, Criminology, et 
al) 
11% 20% 0% 
Group C (Economics, Business, 
et al) 
1% 3% 0% 
Group D (Engineering, 
Computer Science, Cyber, et al) 
12% 15% 10% 
Group E (Psychology, 
Anthropology, et al) 
15% 16% 12% 
Group F (Literature, Arts, 
History, et al) 
7% 5% 7% 
Group G (Independent 
Researchers, Analysts, et al) 
4% 7% 2% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Countermeasures against cyberterrorism by disciplinary background 
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Respondents that identified one 
of the following 12 measures 
60 
29 
(42%) 
7 
(10%) 
1 
(1%) 
12 
(17%) 
11 
(16%) 
5 
(7%) 
4 
(6%) 
Target-hardening 35 
17 
(41%) 
5 
(12%) 
1 
(2%) 
7 
(17%) 
6 
(15%) 
4 
(10%) 
1 
(2%) 
Refusing to exaggerate the 
threat 
8 
6 
(67%) 
- - 
1 
(11%) 
2 
(22%) 
- - 
Greater international co-
operation 
7 
2 
(29%) 
- - 
4 
(57%) 
- 
1 
(14%) 
- 
Utilizing the same responses as 
for cybercrime 
6 
2 
(33%) 
- - 
2 
(33%) 
1 
(17%) 
1 
(17%) 
- 
Preventing radicalization 5 4 - - - 1 - - 
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(80%) (20%) 
Air-walling 4 
3 
(75%) 
- - - 
1 
(25%) 
- - 
Employing hackers 3 - 
1 
(33%) 
- - 
2 
(67%) 
- - 
Greater private sector 
involvement 
3 
2 
(67%) 
- - - - - 
1 
(33%) 
Greater information-sharing 3 - - - 
1 
(33%) 
- 
1 
(33%) 
1 
(33%) 
Increased intelligence 3 
2 
(66%) 
- - - 
1 
(33%) 
- - 
Not militarizing cyberspace 2 
1 
(50%) 
1 
(50%) 
- - - - - 
Greater research 2 
1 
(50%) 
- - - - - 
1 
(50%) 
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